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Industrial solutions combine technology components, maintenance,
training, business consultancy, and ﬁnancial services to produce cus-
tomer value propositions that product-based technology offerings fail
to match (Davies et al., 2001; Frambach, Wels-Lips, & Gündlach, 1997;
Hobday, 2000; Storbacka, 2011). Sizeable literatures exist on the design,
commercialization, and marketing of industrial solutions (Davies &
Hobday, 2005; Nordin & Kowalkowski, 2010; Storbacka, 2011; Terho,
Haas, Eggert, & Ulaga, 2012). In particular, value-based solution selling
has attracted attention among scholars and practitioners. In value-
based selling, sellers seek to understand and inﬂuence their customers'
desire for value, quantify and communicate the value of their offerings
to the customer, and devise a value-based pricing method to capture
some of the value offered to the customer (Hinterhuber & Liozu, 2012;
Storbacka, 2011; Terho et al., 2012; Töytäri, Rajala, & Alejandro, 2015).
Value-based pricing can be achieved by using performance-based
contracting (PBC). In PBC, at least a portion of a contractor's compensa-
tion is tied to the achievement of speciﬁc and measurable performance
standards and requirements. In recent years, PBC has been studied in,.
. This is an open access article underfor example, supply chain management and performance-based logis-
tics (Devries, 2004; Kim, Cohen, & Netessine, 2007; Mirzahosseinian &
Piplani, 2013), business model research (Ng, Xin, & Yip, 2013), service
science (Hypko, Tilebein, & Gleich, 2010a,b; Ng, Maull, & Yip, 2009),
and legal scholarship (Epstein, 2014; Mandaglio, 2010).
In the study reported in this paper, we followed and contributed to
the efforts of Gamma, a division of a global logistics equipment manufac-
turer, as the company was attempting to introduce value-based selling
and pricing to market its new solution offering. The project was fraught
with difﬁculties from the outset. Gamma was struggling to design and
market its new offering and pricing model. The company, for example,
faced considerable difﬁculties in developing the performance-based con-
tracts, encountered customerswith seemingly perverse value perceptions
and had trouble understanding and affecting those value perceptions, as
well as struggled to gain access to inﬂuence within the customers.
Gamma soon understood that to overcome the difﬁculties the com-
pany would be forced to identify and forge appropriate organizational
interfaces, inﬂuence customer value quantiﬁcation tools and processes,
manipulate customer decision-making sequences, and align and ﬁne-
tune the performance-based contracts to match the customer's value
capture model and incentives. A review of the nature of the challenges
led us to view and treat them as arising fromGamma's failure to achieve
sufﬁcient intra- and inter-organizational integration. With the relationalthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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bring about a sales phase (Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005, p. 1852) intra-
and inter-organizational “unity of effort” (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967,
p. 4) that would have allowed Gamma and its customer to reach
agreement.
This prompted us to instigate the development and testing of a ne-
gotiation process based on the functional contracting approach
(Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). The idea was to support
and facilitate the complicated precontractual integration processes be-
tween Gamma and its customers by using contractual techniques to co-
ordinate the negotiation process. In practice, Gamma designed a series
of Memoranda of Understanding to help in orchestrating and sequenc-
ing the organizational and operational transformations necessary for
achieving the desired integration level.
The problems Gamma encountered and the solutions developed con-
stitute the setting for the article's research questions. The high level re-
search question is How can an industrial solution seller commercialize its
solution with value-based selling techniques when using a highly advanced
performance-based contract as the pricing device? The existing literature
was unhelpful. Even if theory suggested (Storbacka, 2011) that solution
providers should widely use value-based pricing in their offerings, we
found no account explaining how an industrial solution provider had suc-
cessfully introduced such offerings and pricing models. The majority of
existing PBC literature focuses on the procurement (i.e. buying) of
complex performance and, thus, on “buy-side” problems (e.g. Caldwell
& Howard, 2011; Hartmann, Roehrich, Frederiksen, & Davies, 2014;
Roehrich & Lewis, 2014) and pays less attention to the problems sellers
face as they attempt to introduce performance-based contracts (Datta
and Roy (2011); Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) are notable exceptions).
The challenges we encountered during the process led us to ask two
sub-questions that lacked answers in the literature at the time we initi-
ated the research project.
Sub-question 1 was framed by our observation that migrating to
value-based selling and pricing was hard for the company. This
prompted us to inquire:What are the factors that hamper solution sellers'
value-based sales efforts? The answers to the question, we later discov-
ered, in many respects matched those identiﬁed by Töytäri et al.
(2015) and Töytäri and Rajala (2015). We, however, diverge from the
ﬁndings of the articles on two issues. First, upon reviewing the obsta-
cles, we concluded that the earlier literature had failed to address the
question (a) What is a suitable theory framework for explaining and ad-
dressing the barriers to value-based selling and pricing?Without adequate
theory, solution development is handicapped. Second, our empirical
material implied that legal-technical contract issues may be much
more persistent obstacles than suggested earlier. In addition, no ac-
counts of how such complexities may be addressed exist. Business
scholars have seldom acknowledged the importance of contracts, even
in passing (cf. Mouzas & Blois, 2013; Töytäri et al., 2015). Legal scholars
have diverted their attention to a number of PBC aspects, such as the
constitutional implications of PBC use, but there are few research arti-
cles with a contract design orientation (cf. Epstein, 2014; Mandaglio,
2010). Thus, we also set out to outline (b)What techniques could be de-
veloped to overcome the legal-technical contract issues?
Sub-question 2 was triggered by our observation that the company,
along with other industry actors, seemed to be missing the potential
that functional contracting techniques could have in facilitating the
precontractual integration required for successful value-based selling.
This prompted us to inquire into the question ofWhat kinds of functional
contracting techniques could facilitate the achievement of the inter-organi-
zational integration necessary for value-based selling with performance-
based contracts?
The empirical observationswemadewhile observing and participat-
ing in the transformation process have a number of important theoret-
ical and practical implications. The study, ﬁrst, contributes to the
literature by deepening the understanding of the challenges that relate
to PBC use in industrial solutions sales. Chief among these are twoobservations. First, PBC use may be inhibited by the value-sharing pat-
tern entrenchment effect that Töytäri et al. (2015) identiﬁed. Second,
companies have to consciously work to overcome this reluctance to-
wards value-based pricing through legal sales efforts. Concerted legal
sales efforts, where the seller attempts to demonstrate the feasibility
of its contracts, are needed as entrenching the contracts is likely a key
success factor in PBC-based industrial solutions sales.
Second, the ﬁndings highlight the importance of proper integration
design in facilitating the value-based and legal selling of industrial solu-
tions. Our contention is that the complex multi-layer intra- and inter-
organizational transformations necessary for successful solution sales
when using advanced performance-based contracts as value capture
devices require the deployment of the functional contracting approach.
In addition, our evidence provides insights into how functional
contracting techniques may be used to create the necessary level of in-
tegration. One crucial limitation of our research is that we lack quantita-
tive data on the effects of the functional contracting process as most of
the sales cases that we observed are still ongoing, while others have
failed due to reasons unrelated to this study.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,we conduct a literature
review on industrial solutions, value-based selling, integration, perfor-
mance-based contracting, and functional contracting theory. In Section
3, we discuss the methodology employed in the study and the data we
collected. The section further describes the value-based sales process
development project we initiated and participated in during the study.
In Section 4, we discuss the empirical ﬁndings of our study. In Section 5,
we present and discuss key conclusions and their relation to extant
research streams. In addition, we propose future research directions.
2. Literature review
As our ﬁndings suggest, the factors that hampered the case
company's sales efforts were best theorized as precontractual, sales
phase integration difﬁculties. Further, we discovered that functional
contracting techniques could facilitate the required precontractual inte-
gration for successful value-based selling. Consequently, we will brieﬂy
review the literature on industrial solutions, value-based selling, inte-
gration in industrial solutions, performance-based contracting, and
functional contracting.
This entails that we forgo, for example, explicit customer relation-
ship management, co-creation, sales management, and market orienta-
tion perspectives as the theoretical backdrops for our study, although
these are implicitly present as tacit approaches in the integrationmech-
anisms designed at the case company.
2.1. Industrial solutions
Integrated industrial solutions are “longitudinal relational processes,
during which a solution provider integrates goods, service and knowl-
edge components into unique combinations that solve strategically im-
portant customer speciﬁc problems, and [is] compensated on the basis
of the customer's value-in-use” (Storbacka, 2011, p. 699). This results
in the solution provider often identifying and diagnosing problems in
the customer's organization (the business model and processes of
which the customer might have been unaware) and offering proactive
solutions that aid the customer in overcoming these problems. More-
over, compared to a traditional goods- or product-dominant business
logic (Grönroos, 2000; Vargo & Lusch, 2004), migrating towards an in-
dustrial solution business model that “is characterized by longitudinal
processes and collaboration that involve several functions of both the
buying and selling organization” (Storbacka, 2011, p. 699) entails sever-
al shifts and repositionings. These shifts affect the industry value chains
and required organizational capabilities (Galbraith, 2002) and add to
the complexity of performance and contractual arrangements used
when selling and procuring the solutions (Caldwell & Howard, 2011).
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In industrial solution sales, the sellers' focus is on the added value
the offering provides to the customer, making the seller market orient-
ed. For instance, Haas, Snehota and Corsaro (2012, p. 102) stress the im-
portance of understanding and communicating the added value during
sales and state that “skilled selling” involves an in-depth “understand-
ing of the customer with its markets and operations”. In this paradigm,
marketing is an activity, which 1) should be pursued by thewhole orga-
nization and integrated with other activities of the company, and 2) is
aimed at increasing the adaptability of the company to its market by
adjusting its organizational attitude and behavior to market conditions
(Avlonitis &Gounaris, 1997). Thus, effectivemarket orientation requires
that the seller understand the market, distribute knowledge about the
market within the ﬁrm, and develop strategies and plans according to
this knowledge (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). Adopting a “market-orienta-
tion” and a “market culture” allows ﬁrms to incorporate their knowl-
edge about the market and facilitates a “value-focus” and the
development of innovative value propositions (Slater, 1997).
The value-based selling approach takes market orientation in sales
to its extreme (Terho et al., 2012). The approach has emerged as both
a ﬁeld of research and an effective strategy for a subset of companies
to succeed in competitive markets (see e.g., Rackham & DeVincentis,
1999). Certain aspects of value-based selling are relatively well-
known. Terho et al. (2012) provide the basic conceptual framework
for value-based selling. Value-based selling is a proactive marketing
practice. In it, sellers typically focus on communicating and demonstrat-
ing the proﬁt impact that the seller's solution offers to the prospective
customer instead of seeking to offer a lower price than their competi-
tors. To succeed, the seller must, however, often inﬂuence the
customer's value perception and negotiate the value perception dis-
crepancies or points of contention (Anderson, Kumar, & Narus, 2008).
Once the value has been communicated, the demonstrability of value
“takes the sales out of selling” (Terho et al., 2012), which means that
in value-based sales, the value proposition is based on solid and veriﬁ-
able data rather than on marketing appeals.
Even if value-based sellingmay take the sales out of selling, research
indicates that sellers often encounter a number of challenges. Research
has, for example, suggested that value-based selling requires a speciﬁc
set of organizational capabilities, some of which are hard to achieve.
Sellers must foster a distinct mindset in their sales organizations that
has to be consistently supported by management, and develop new
sales tools and approaches tailored to value-based selling. The cus-
tomers are also unlikely to be receptive to value-based selling efforts
as value sharing is not always accepted “as a legitimate logic of value ex-
change” (Töytäri & Rajala, 2015, p. 109). A second study (Töytäri et al.,
2015) further identiﬁed a large number of institutional and organiza-
tional barriers to value-based selling. These include, for example, prob-
lems in gaining access to inﬂuence within customers, affecting
customers' value perceptions, and the perceived fairness of cost-based
pricing patterns. Despite the recent advances in understanding value-
based selling, the study states that signiﬁcant gaps remain. Existing re-
search has not elaborated, for example, on 1) how value-based pricing
may be used to foster the performance of the business model, 2) how
value-based selling and pricing should be integrated, or 3) how con-
tracts may pose an important institutional constraint on pricing.
2.3. Integration in the value-based selling of industrial solutions
One strand of the industrial solutions literature has addressed inte-
gration in industrial solutions. Scholars have argued that effective inte-
gration is key to efﬁcient industrial solutions delivery (Davies & Brady,
2000; Davies, Brady, & Hobday, 2007; Prencipe, Davies, & Hobday,
2003). Kirsilä, Hellström, andWikström (2007) argue that participating
organizations must coordinate and adapt their activities on several
levels and with multiple tools to “bring […] or join […] together anumber of things so that theymove, operate and function as a harmoni-
ous unit” (p. 715).
The key factor that makes the integration literature relevant in the
context of value-based selling is that many of the value-based selling
challenges that Töytäri et al. (2015) identify are, in fact, integration
problems. First, inﬂuencing the customer-desired value requires that
both the seller and customer organizations coordinate and adapt their
activities so that the seller gains access to “power”, is able to affect the
mindset of those in “power” and can orchestrate the incentives within
the customer organization at the right time during the sales process.
Second, to affect the way in which the customer perceives the value,
the seller has to somehow gain access to the customer's pre-existing
value understanding and function, detailed business performance
data, and overcome potential distrust and reluctance to quantify value.
Third, the seller must induce changes in established value-sharing fair-
ness patterns. Although the industrial solution integration literature
mostly focuses on solutions design and delivery integration, we propose
that the integration literature offers tools, integration mechanisms, for
overcoming the abovementioned barriers to value-based selling.
Multiple integration mechanisms have been identiﬁed in the solu-
tions delivery literature. In general, ﬁrms coordinate and adapt their
technological offerings to complement and co-functionwith one anoth-
er (Davies & Hobday, 2005; Iansiti, 1995; Martinez & Jarillo, 1989;
McCord & Eppinger, 1993) in technical integration. Both formal and rela-
tional (or social) integrationmechanisms ensure the compatibility of or-
ganizations and operational models (Barki & Pinsonneault, 2005;
Barnard, 1968; Cacciatori & Jacobides, 2005; Galbraith, 2002;
Henderson & Clark, 1990; Hobday, Davies, & Prencipe, 2005; Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967). The different types of integration mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive, interchangeable, or separate. Technical, formal,
and relational integration mechanisms constantly interact and overlap
(Liinamaa & Wikström, 2009). For example, Poppo and Zenger (2002,
p. 721) have shown that managers tend to use themechanisms to com-
plement each other. They employ greater levels of relational integration
mechanisms when contracts, that is, formal integration mechanisms,
are customized, and they also employ greater contractual complexity
as they develop greater levels of relational governance. In this paper,
we call the integration mechanism mixes that sustain solutions sales
processes integration models.
Our contention is that an important success factor in the value-based
selling of industrial solutions is designing an appropriate precontractual
integration model that allows the seller and the buyer to align their
sales and purchasing processes, value perceptions, and value sharing ar-
rangements. As different customers have varying organizational inter-
faces, quantify and measure value with different tools and under
divergent processes, have varied decision-making sequences, and use
different earning models, an integration model customized to ﬁt a par-
ticular customer and business context plays an important role in facili-
tating value co-creation in industrial solutions (Grönroos, 2008; Vargo
& Lusch, 2004).
2.4. Performance-based contracting
Studies on industrial solutions and value-based selling suggest that
solution providers are likely to adopt a pricing strategy that captures a
portion of the value created by the solution (Storbacka, 2011, p. 699;
Terho et al., 2012). Performance-based contracts seempertinent devices
in such pricing strategies.
Research interest in PBC has increased simultaneously with its pop-
ularity in practice. Since the 1960s (Marcus, 1964), PBC has been used in
awide variety of business contexts, ranging fromdefense and aerospace
(Kim et al., 2007;Marcus, 1964; Ng et al., 2009, 2013) to health care and
welfare (Meezan & McBeath, 2008), public transportation (Hensher &
Stanley, 2003, 2008a,b), and building (Gruneberg, Hughes, & Ancell,
2007). PBC has been studied in recent years in connection with supply
chain management or performance-based logistics (Devries, 2004;
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search (Ng et al., 2013), service science (Hypko et al., 2010; Ng et al.,
2009), and legal scholarship (Epstein, 2014; Mandaglio, 2010). In addi-
tion, managerial and employee compensation schemes often incorpo-
rate PBC techniques (Stabile, 1999) and have garnered avid research
interest.
Perhaps the best deﬁnition of PBC is contained in the Chartered
Institute of Supply and Procurement's (CIPS) and The Institute for
Public Procurement's (NIGP) document on Principles and Practices of
Public Procurement (2012). According to the document, PBC “is a re-
sults-oriented contracting method that focuses on the outputs, quality,
or outcomes that may tie at least a portion of a contractor's payment,
contract extensions, or contract renewals to the achievement of speciﬁc,
measurable performance standards and requirements. These contracts
may include bothmonetary and non-monetary incentives and disincen-
tives” (p. 3). The deﬁnition highlights three crucial aspects of PBC: 1) an
emphasis on the effects of contractual performance for the customer,
2) a value capture or pricing model distinct from charging a simple
ﬁxed price, and 3) a focus on incentivizing appropriate performance.
These three aspects are placed in a business model transformation con-
text by Ng et al. (2009), who argue that the proliferation of PBC use is a
function of the transition from product to service delivery and the con-
comitant transition from a goods- or product-dominant to service-dom-
inant business logic.
Most existing studies focus on buy-side problems in public procure-
ment projects where PBC is primarily used to target principal-agent
problems. Only few detailed sell-side accounts of PBC pricing models
exist, and mostly focus on strategizing (c.f. Datta & Roy, 2011;
Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014), rather than commercializing andmarket-
ing performance-based solutions.Moreover, even though the barriers to
value-based pricing and value-based selling are identiﬁed, for example,
by Töytäri et al. (2015), there is no research on how the contracts per se
affect the successful implementation of performance-based solution de-
livery with a value-based pricing mechanism.
2.5. Functional contracting
Contracts, contracting and negotiations have been extensively
discussed in both managerial and legal literature. The literature is dom-
inated by two approaches: relational contracting theory (e.g. Macneil,
1978), and transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1985). Despite
the pertinence of legal concerns, interdisciplinary accounts merging, for
instance, management and legal perspectives to contracting are rela-
tively few and limited in scope. A few notable exceptions exist. Contract
management has emerged and matured into a distinct discipline and
profession during recent years (e.g. IACCM, 2013; Saxena, 2008). Anoth-
er body of literature reviewed, for example, by Schepker et al. (2014)
hasmapped themanagerial implications of innovative contracting prac-
tices and given rise to a functional approach to contracting.
In our context, the functional approach to contracting opens up a
view on the complicated milieu of contract law and contract practices
within which value-based selling and PBC are located. Further, it offers
a novel plane for business integration efforts.
In linewith Töytäri et al. (2015), our contention is that the tradition-
al contracting mindset is a key barrier to value-based sales (p. 62) and,
based on Gamma's experience, to PBC deployment. The reason is that
the traditional contracting mindset performs contracts as structural
governance tools. In this frame, called the structural approach by
Schepker et al. (2014), contracts serve a safeguarding function by ﬁxing
rights and obligations that remain dormant until eventual litigation, and
formalize incentive structures designed to deter opportunistic behavior.
The majority of management scholars have adopted this approach to
contracts and contracting. Contracting is treated like plumbing: it is vis-
ible and relevant only when it fails. This invisibility has been ampliﬁed
by the relational contract theory, which has, probably inadvertently,
while trying to adjust contract law to the emerging complex regimesof exchange come to emphasize the importance of non-formal and
non-juridiﬁed contracting and deal-making (e.g. Gilmore, 1974;
MacNeil, 1978).
In recent years, both management and contract scholarship have,
however, evolved to acknowledge that contract uses may eclipse the
mere implementation of the safeguarding function. Both contract man-
agement and the functional approach view contracts as active manage-
ment tools, and crucial to business success (Barringer & Harrison, 2000;
Saxena, 2008). Consequently, both legal andmanagement scholars have
argued that future contracting research should focus on the coordina-
tion (facilitating cooperation) and adaptation (adapting to changed cir-
cumstances) functions fulﬁlled by contracts and the relationship
between contract terms and performance (Eigen, 2012; Schepker et
al., 2014). In this conception, contracts may, and should, be understood
as relational governance tools that may have added value in, for in-
stance, business integration efforts.3. Methodology and data
3.1. Collaborative and explorative action research
The nature of the research setting directed us to apply a variation
of explorative action research (Chein, Cook, & Harding, 1948; Clark,
1980; Lewin, 1946; Susman & Evered, 1978). Lewin (1946) charac-
terized action research as “a comparative research on the conditions
and effects of various forms of social action and research leading to
social action” (pp. 202–203). According to Clark (1980), “action re-
search enables social science to discharge its dual responsibility of
contributing to scientiﬁc discovery and the solution of practical
problems […] by applying the elements of action research that are
the explicit set of values, concepts and methods that together make
up a theory of research and practice” (pp. 151–152). In other
words, in action research, researchers attempt to make scientiﬁc dis-
coveries while simultaneously solving practical problems by
adopting the three original activities of action research, namely, ac-
tion, research, and training (Lewin, 1946).
As we participated in contract model and sales process develop-
ment in collaboration with the practitioners in Gamma, the setting
was ideal for an action research approach. “Sales technique” and
pricing models served as the focal theme of the study. We attempted
to develop holistic and systemic (Clark, 1980) understandings of the
kinds of sales techniques and pricing models that could facilitate
value-based selling and of how the techniques and models Gamma
used could be improved. This objective was pursued in the typical
collaborative research setting of two or more parties, where 1) at
least one party is a member of the organization or system under
study, and 2) at least one party is an external researcher, working to-
gether to both improve the performance of a system and add to the
broader body of knowledge in the ﬁeld of management (Pasmore,
Stymne, Shani, Mohrman, & Adler, 2008, p. 20). This form of knowl-
edge creation is referred to by Schein (1987, 1995, 2001) as “clinical
research”, and as “engaged scholarship” by Van de Ven and Johnson
(2006). As Clark (1980) noted, working collaboratively “keeps the
study close to the data” (p. 156), which in turn enhances the chances
of grounded theory development (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
During our collaboration, we ﬁrst engaged Gamma in a sense-mak-
ing project by conducting a series of workshops and meetings on
Gamma's sales process and value capture contracts. We used the resul-
tant understanding to offer and instigate new design ideas, which we,
then, helped the company to deploy and test with its customers and, ﬁ-
nally, evaluated in line with the experimental action research approach
(Susman & Evered, 1978, p. 588). The study, thus, proceeded as a cycli-
cal process and encompassed the ﬁve phases of action research de-
scribed by Susman and Evered (1978): diagnosing, action planning,
action taking, evaluating, and specifying learning.
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The research project began at the end of 2013. At that time, Gamma
had decided that its traditional businessmodel was not feasible and had
made a decision to redesign its existing businessmodel, review its prod-
uct and service palette, and design a new industrial solution offering
package that it would eventually introduce to themarket. The company
had also reviewed data on existing industry installed base and its tech-
nical performance together with researchers afﬁliated with our team to
identify a solution market niche and potential buyers. After data and
market analysis, it became apparent that Gamma had a viable market
but was unable to capitalize on the value of its advanced solutions offer-
ing due to the inherent limitations of its then-current sales process.
Gamma lacked sufﬁcient value-based selling methods for capitalizing
on its competitive advantage. We started active collaboration on the
sales process in January 2014 and continued until June 2015.We partic-
ipated in and contributed to several brainstorming and development
meetings at Gamma. The most important events in the value-based
sales process development are presented in the timeline in Fig. 1.
After deﬁning the problem, the objective was to apply insights from
the existing literature and help the company develop the performance-
based contract and a ﬁrst blueprint for the new value-based sales and
contracting process. Sales and contracting process design and contract
development were iterative processes. We reviewed Gamma's existing
processes, attended select customer meetings to gain customer feed-
back, and conducted debrieﬁngs andworkshopswithGamma represen-
tatives to arrive at the ﬁrst blueprints.
Once the ﬁrst blueprints were ﬁnalized, Gamma began to deploy the
approach in order to commence piloting and evaluation of the sales pro-
cess and contracts it had developed. To observe and facilitate piloting,
we participated in customer meetings, conducted debrieﬁng sessions
and sales training workshops with Gamma representatives and
reviewed the sales progress follow-up reports. Feedback and reactions
from Gamma sales personnel, solution designers, legal departmentFig. 1. Value-based sales process deand customers' representatives allowed us to identify salient but recur-
ring issues in the sales and contracting process designs and further
modify the blueprints. These modiﬁcations resulted in signiﬁcant revi-
sions to the blueprints, process categorization and sequencing. We, for
example, co-designed the “Ghost Protocol” (see Section 4.2)–a device
that allows for the quantiﬁcation of customers' added ﬁnancial perfor-
mance–as a direct response to customer feedback. Similarly, the need
for the escalation procedure (see Section 4.4) to ensure pricing model
acceptance was identiﬁed during the sales and contracting process
piloting. In addition, piloting also contributed to the design of the nego-
tiation code of conduct as good faith and prompt termination obliga-
tions were included in the Memorandum of Understanding 1 (see
Section 4.4).
The ﬁnal stage of our action research project focused on specifying
generalizable learnings. This involved twoprocesses thatwere scattered
and to a large degree overlapping in time. The practical learning process
with the case company was characterized by iterative reﬁnements of
our understanding of the company, its position, the possibilities and
limits of practical instruments it attempted to deploy, and the theories
we used to make sense of them all. This process required us to identify
commonalities and discrepancies in Gamma's experiences in the differ-
ent sales cases. The other process included elaborating the scientiﬁc
ﬁndings further when we wrote and revised this paper. That process
was also incremental.We reviewed the datawehad collected, discussed
it, and tried tomake sense of its theoretical implications, often in heated,
passionate exchanges (Latour, 2010, pp. 201–202).
Table 1 summarizes how we implemented the action research
phases in our study, and reﬂects the discussion on data collection pre-
sented above.
3.3. Data analysis
In order to develop anunderstanding of the kinds of sales techniques
and pricingmodels that could facilitate value-based selling and how thevelopment timeline and data.
Table 1
Action research phases as applied in the study.
Phase Phase description Methods
1. Diagnosing Identifying or deﬁning a problem • Meetings with the project team and in-depth discussions with key representatives (solution designers and
sales manager) of Gamma.
• A review of Gamma's relevant documentation, customer data, and processes.
2. Action
planning
Considering alternative sources of action
for solving a problem
• Review and application of forward-looking methods for identifying potential customers in collaboration with
Gamma.
• Meetings with Gamma's key representatives on contract and sales process design.
• Iterative discussions with Gamma's representatives, including their legal department.
• Review of relevant literature focusing on value-based sales and contracting.
3. Action
taking
Selecting a course of action • Collaborating closely (meetings, emails, and phone calls) with Gamma's representatives when they designed
the contracts and the sales process.
• Participating in negotiations with selected customers.
• Providing sales training to sales personnel in Gamma's network ofﬁces.
• Following up on sales and negotiations through phone calls, emails, and meetings.
4. Evaluating Studying the consequences of an action • Analyses of memos and feedback from business cases, focusing on Gamma's experience while implementing
the value-based sales approach.
• Reviews of evolving sales training.
• In-depth discussions and iterative process creation of the sales and negotiation processes, together with
Gamma's sales manager, solution designer, and legal department.
5. Specifying
learning
Identifying general ﬁndings • Following up on business cases and sales progress.
• Meetings with Gamma's key representatives (sales manager, solution designer, and legal department) to
identify and discuss commonalities across individual case ﬁndings.
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lection and analysis focused on the following issues: 1) what sales tech-
niques and processes facilitate value-based selling?, 2) how may the
seller design a performance-based contract in order to price its offer-
ing?, and 3) what kind of integration model could be deployed to inte-
grate seller and buyer organizations?.
Data analysis was conducted throughout the data collection by ap-
plying the focus issues as a basis for dialogue with the company and
for structuring the analysis of the ﬁndings. During the data collection
and analysis process we had three topical teams, consisting of both re-
searchers and company representatives, each focusing on one of the
outlined issues. This helped each team to individually capture the rele-
vant data during the data collection and analysis. In parallel with the in-
dividual team analysis, all the teams collaboratively discussed their
perspectives accumulated during the research process, achieving trian-
gulation of the data.
The actionability of the results constitutes themain quality criterion
in action research (Bradbury, 2008). The results must have practical
value, facilitate further social interaction, andwithstand cycles of reﬂec-
tion, action, and active experimentation. These criteria are all grounded
in the fundamental pragmatism of action research. The research project
allowed both us and Gamma to validate the three outlined issues on a
conceptual and practical level. Furthermore, the sales and contracting
processes, together with their supporting theories, have been subjected
to, and survived, multiple cycles of reﬂection, action, and active experi-
mentation at Gamma.
4. Findings
The research that we conducted at Gamma resulted in four key
empirical ﬁndings. First, the signiﬁcant challenges Gamma encoun-
tered in designing the performance-based contract and commercial-
izing the value capture model led us to believe that value-based
sellers wishing to deploy value sharing pricing models must over-
come a number of barriers. Our empirical data on value-based selling
barriers is congruent with that reported by Töytäri et al. (2015) (see
Section 4.1). Second, we identiﬁed a new important barrier to cap-
turing a share of the value. Our data suggest that legal-technical
problems in drafting the performance-based contracts will likely
handicap sellers wishing to use advanced value-based pricing tech-
niques and capture a share of the value their offering produces (see
Section 4.2). Third, as we worked to overcome the barriers, our un-
derstanding of the mechanisms that give rise to the barriersdeveloped. Our analysis of empirical data led us to posit that many
of the barriers, in fact, result from insufﬁcient integration of the sell-
er and buyer organizations (see Section 4.3). This theoretical insight
informed the next practical step in the project. We set out to design
and test which integration models produce a sufﬁcient level of inte-
gration. During the design and testing of integration models, we ob-
served that Gamma did not fully utilize innovative functional
contracting techniques in its integration efforts. We initiated the
co-creation of a sales and contracting process that implements the
functional contracting approach. Fourth, the data suggests that func-
tional contracting techniques could play a key role in facilitating
sales phase integration (see Section 4.4).
4.1. Barriers to value-based selling and pricing
Our research conﬁrms the ﬁndings by Töytäri et al. (2015, pp. 57–
60) that multiple barriers hamper value-based pricing adoption. During
the project, Gamma encountered most of these barriers.
The company, for example, had trouble gaining access to inﬂuence as
its usual counterparties within customer organizations faced budget
constraints, had limited negotiation authorization, or lacked the capac-
ity to transcend established mindsets.“The challenge for grasping the [platform] earning potential is caused by
the complexity of decision making processes. Customers have different
departments, for example [platformmonetization method 1] and [plat-
form monetization method 2] departments. [Platform monetization
method 1 employees] are often non-technical people and do not make
decisions based on the expected proﬁts that extra [output] could bring
for them”.
[Fleet manager, Platform owner]
Further, Gamma found itself arguingwith customers who refused to
frame investment decisions in terms of their revenue implications but,
rather, insisted on minimizing the initial capital expenditure regardless
of subsequent subpar revenue outlook.
“In the beginning, they [the customers] were only interested in Capex.”
[Project manager 1, Gamma]
“The tradition of maximizing the earning ability of [the platform] is seen
to be lost in the current [platform] business. In the past they knew how
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[Fleet manager, Platform owner]
“The maturity of some customers is now [June 2015] at a level where
they understand the beneﬁts of Gamma's offering but they still will
not act accordingly.”
[Project owner, Gamma]
In addition, the industry had entrenched practices forcing the cus-
tomers to adopt a perverse understanding of the earning potential of
their installed base. The customers often received a signiﬁcant portion
of their earnings based on the theoretical technical capacity of the
installed base instead of its actual ﬁnancial performance. This contribut-
ed to the seemingly irrational understanding of the value the customers
entertained and even prompted Gamma to initiate a project with an in-
dustry standardization body to change the way performance was
measured.
“They earn in bizarre ways. Most of the value our solution creates will
slip to their alliance partners who make no investments.”
[Project owner, Gamma]
Customer employees also often had a strong conception—and even
at the level of board decisions—of the maximum investments they
were willing to make. Similarly, access to baseline data was a problem
as many customers and industry data aggregators either did not have
or were not able to disclose past performance data.
“Our customer contracts restrict us from providing the actual data to a
third party, and thus we cannot distribute it.”
[Executive, Industry data aggregator]
In addition, customer value functions were exceedingly difﬁcult to
map. The ﬁnancial performance drivers varied from customer to cus-
tomer, displayed complex correlation structures, and often eluded for-
malization attempts (see below Section 4.2).
Gamma faced an uphill battle when it tried to justify its new pricing
model as the customers perceived traditional cost-plus approach as the
legitimate approach and communicated a strongpreference for paying a
ﬁxed price.
“The presented revenue sharing model was rejected by the customer.
We had to go back to the earlier version [ﬁxed price] of the revenue
sharing model.”
[Project owner, Gamma]
Finally, pricing model costs and uncertainties were an oft-encoun-
tered issue, as will be reported below in detail.4.2. Legal-technical barriers
In addition to conﬁrming previous research ﬁndings on barriers, our
data suggests that legal-technical issues may be signiﬁcant barriers to
value-based pricing model adoption. The issue is under-explored in
the literature. Töytäri et al. (2015) posit in passing that “value-based
pricing generally requires monitoring value creation through periodic
value veriﬁcation. Value veriﬁcation is costly and in itself risky”
(p. 59). Further, they state that “contracts make an important institu-
tional setting for pricing, thereby underscoring the importance of con-
tracts as institutional factors that affect pricing decisions” (p. 62).
Gamma's experience with designing the performance-based con-
tracts was fraught with difﬁculties from its commencement in March
2014. The ﬁrst order of business was to design a set of key performance
indicators thatwould allow the parties to calculate the increase inﬁnan-
cial performance Gamma's solution created for the customer. After a de-
tailed study undertaken during the spring and summer of 2014, Gamma
realized that improvements in customers' ﬁnancial performance, that isthe customer's value function,was exceedingly complex tomap and dif-
ﬁcult to formalize.
How much the customer earned was dependent not only on 1) the
mechanical performance and 2) usability of the installed base, but also
on a host of other contingent factors, including, for example, 3) market
conditions, that is, demand and price for the services provided by the
customer to the market, 4) idiosyncrasies in customer value capture
and pricing models, 5) the particular uses to which the customer
chose to deploy the installed base, 6) the customers' operational capa-
bilities, which could vary to a great degree through time even for a sin-
gle customer, and 7) pure luck. In addition, even if operational costs
were typically of minor importance, full utilization of the added me-
chanical performance could incur signiﬁcant added costs if implement-
ed poorly. Worse, the revenue and cost drivers were entangled.
“Baseline ﬁxing is really difﬁcult, but critical. We have to ﬁnd a way to
mathematically take all the things into question, for instance sample pe-
riod choice, the general market conditions and their impact on customer
earning opportunities, the seasonal variations in demand [for customer
services], the actual demand [for different service conﬁgurations which
affect the platform output], and the service price”.
[Project manager 1, Gamma]
Furthermore, even if mapping was possible, turning the resulting
understanding into functional contractual clauses and a pricing mecha-
nism in a performance-based contract added a new layer of complexity.
The simple performance-based contract designs were not feasible.
Using, for example, historical averages, actual measurements or stan-
dardized performance measurements was out of question. After inten-
sive work during summer of 2014, the “Ghost Protocol” methodology
was developed. After experimenting with several alternative designs,
Gamma settled on an approach in which the ﬁnancial performance of
the ex ante (before solution delivery) installed base (the “Ghost”) was
simulated with actual post-delivery market data, while ex post (after
solution delivery) performancewasmeasured. Several challenges, how-
ever, remained as, for example, ex post performance measurements
remained ambiguous. Second, the implementation of the “Ghost Proto-
col” required building a signiﬁcant data exchange infrastructure and
sizeable investments in simulation resources resulting in high pricing
model costs.
“The Ghost Protocol will be expensive to run.”
[Project manager 1, Gamma]
The procedure was also vulnerable to opportunism, as any simula-
tions had to be veriﬁed and potential disputes on results settled. In part
to address the opportunism issue, in part to gain acceptable to its value
veriﬁcation methods, Gamma initiated a project with an industry stan-
dardization body to produce a third-party baseline veriﬁcation method.
Gamma's experiences during value function mapping and perfor-
mance-based contract development suggest theﬁrst key ﬁnding on per-
formance-based contracts. In the existing literature, most of the
reported performance-based contracts have been relatively simple.
For instance, the well-known Rolls-Royce Power-by-the-Hour contract
ties maintenance payments to actual aircraft engine operation hours
but shies away from measuring or, even, sharing the value the services
add. Similarly, most construction performance-based contracts function
through deﬁned bonuses and penalties, not through sharing the added
value the solution produces. In advanced added-value-sharing perfor-
mance-based contracts, such as ours, parties are likely to encounter ex-
tremely difﬁcult, if not prohibitive, value capture model design and
contract drafting problems.
Law and lawyers are the likely explanation for the problems Gamma
encountered. Both sales staff and in-house counsel enact and perform
the structural contracting approach in their everyday actions. The ap-
proach dictates that to effectively serve their primary function,
safeguarding, all contracts must be absolutely unambiguous, complete
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and obligations to the contracting parties. In sum, the structural
contracting approach has a low tolerance for contractual ambiguity, un-
certainty, and incompleteness.
Another point worth noting is the fact that the ex ante and ex post
ﬁnancial performance could only be measured with complicated simu-
lation tools. The remaining ambiguity had to be procedurally controlled.
This highlights a conceptual transformation in the contractingmodality.
Advanced performance-based contracts do not only preﬁx and allocate
complete rosters of rights and obligations at the time of contract signing
as contracts are assumed to do under the structural contracting ap-
proach. Instead, they are likely to assemble complex institutional frame-
works for determining the rights and obligations of the parties during
solution delivery, adapting to changed and unanticipated circum-
stances, and resolving disputes.
4.3. Value-based selling as an integration problem
The third ﬁnding of our research project concerns the appropriate
theoretical framework for developing solutions to challenges in value-
based selling and pricing. The mechanisms underlying the barriers re-
main under-theorized. The lack of theorization hampered our efforts
to design effective strategies to overcome the barriers. To develop solu-
tions, we had to analyze the empirical data in order to identify a useful
theoretical framework.
After reviewing alternative frameworks, we decided to test treating
the challenges Gamma faced as business integration problems. Thus,we
posited that Gamma was failing to coordinate and adapt its own and its
customers' activities. It lacked the required integration model that
would allow it to, for example, gain access to “power”, affect the
mindset of those in “power”, orchestrate the incentives within the cus-
tomer organization, gain access to the customer's pre-existing value un-
derstanding, function and detailed business performance data,
overcome potential distrust and reluctance to quantify value, and, ﬁnal-
ly, induce changes in established value sharing fairness patterns. In
short, the seller and buyer organizations must be integrated both on
the relational and formal planes in order to reach the desired structure
and governance mode as the integration outcome.
This insight offered us a new avenue to facilitate value-based selling
and value-based pricing model adoption. The integration heuristic in-
formed Gamma's efforts to revamp its existing sales process. In the pro-
cess, Gamma attempted to use relational and formal integration
mechanisms to overcome the barriers to value-based selling and pric-
ing. Value-based selling would be possible when and if Gamma was
able to induce sufﬁcient integrationwith its customers andbring thede-
sired changes and governance structures into being. Many of the inte-
grative devices, however, served a dual purpose in facilitating both
internal and external integration.
4.4. Functional contracting
The data collected during sales process testing suggests that value-
based selling and pricing will likely trigger unexpected contract-related
challenges. Further, the data imply that these challenges cannot be ad-
dressed with the usual relational and formal integration mechanisms.
Instead, contract-related sales challenges will likely require new inte-
gration mechanisms.
In Gamma, four problems emerged. First, the customers struggled to
understand what Gamma was seeking to do. As the solution develop-
ment project owner said in June 2014: “All the different stakeholders to
whom the value-based business model has been introduced seem equally
confused but interested”. A frequent sales staff complaint was that the
customer purchasing staff, who were Gamma's primary contacts, did
not understand the pricing model contracts well enough to be able to
evaluate them and, possibly, escalate them to top management.Second, the customer purchasing staff did not have sufﬁcient au-
thority to even tentatively approve the contracts, even had theywanted
to. Approving a new pricing model was often subject to a customer top
management or board decision and always conditional upon its law-
yers' endorsement. The customers' frontline employees' confusion
placed the contracts in limbo. They nevermade theirway to theﬁnal de-
cision makers as the gatekeepers did not actively seek the necessary
approvals.
Third, Gamma found itself in a precarious position. Detailed techni-
cal planning of how the customers' installed base could be upgraded
constituted a key value-adding service component in Gamma's solution.
To demonstrate the value of its solution, Gamma was, however, forced
to provide detailed technical plans to its customers. Once Gamma deliv-
ered the plans, the genie was out of the bottle. Customers “milked”
Gamma. They used the plans as tender speciﬁcations and invited com-
petitors to tender for equipment delivery. As a high-cost technology
leader, Gamma typically lost the tenders, effectively helping technolog-
ically sub-par competitors with no design competence to deliver a par-
tial technological solution. To add to problems, Gamma had no non-
contractual tools available to safeguard its situation. As Gamma had
made a decision to sell its solution only with the new performance-
based contracts, it became crucial that customers commit to the pricing
model before Gamma disclosed the technical plans.
All the abovementioned problems made it imperative that Gamma
be able to change the typical structure of commercial negotiations.
The industry standard was that negotiations were conducted between
sales and purchasing staffs. The formal contracts were an afterthought.
Lawyers typically only became involved after agreement on commercial
terms had been reached. For Gamma, the normal contracting frame-
work was disastrous. It allowed the “milking” to continue, rendered
themarketing of the new pricingmodel very difﬁcult, and allowed cus-
tomers the possibility of backtracking from value-based pricing at any
time. Simultaneously, Gamma acknowledged that under the new pro-
cess, it would have to consciously market its performance-based con-
tract, make sure it was understandable to customers, and structure the
sales process to force an early commitment to the pricing model from
customers. Consequently, the contracts had to be a focal issue in the
sales process. The usual relational and formal integration mechanisms,
however, did not help in attaining these objectives.
To achieve Gamma's objectives, we co-developed a new functional
contracting process to run parallel to and complement the sales process
(Fig. 2). The process utilizes functional contractual techniques to coordi-
nate the negotiation process, affect customer expectations, and imple-
ment changes to customer attitudes and its organizational make-up.
In short, we used formal integration tools to pursue relational integra-
tion. Technically, the process consisted of a succession of memoranda
of understanding (MoUs), contractual instruments. The MoUs are se-
quential, with each MoU customized to match and address the speciﬁc
challenges the company expects to encounter at each phase of the
sales process.
MoU 1 sets the scene for the negotiation process: it 1) introduces the
basic outline of the negotiation process Gamma wishes to implement,
2) offers a preliminary description of the pricingmodel and the concom-
itant contracts, 3) outlines the information exchange plan for negotia-
tions, and 4) establishes the obligations to negotiate in good faith
and to terminate negotiations should it become clear that either of
the parties realizes that a performance-based contract will not be con-
cluded. In addition, MoU 1 contains important non-utilization and non-
disclosure terms that seek to preempt opportunistic behavior by the
customer.
MoU 1 serves a number of purposes. First, it attempts to structure
the future negotiation process by setting “gates” (akin to milestones)
by which both Gamma and the customer may track their progress to-
wards securing a ﬁnal contract. Second, MoU 1 communicates the
terms on which Gamma is willing to negotiate with the customer. As
such, MoU 1 is also an internal commitment device for Gamma when
Fig. 2. Value-based sales process and functional contracting process.
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Third, the MoU attempts to mitigate the risk of customer opportunistic
behavior by binding the customer to explicit negotiation ethics. Fourth,
the memorandum serves as a strategic business intelligence tool. If the
customer is not willing to sign the MoU, which only weakly binds the
parties, Gamma gains important information on customer motivation
and interests. Fifth, MoU 1 engages in legal sales. It outlines the perfor-
mance-based contract and contains information on its crucial features
to convince gatekeepers.
MoU 2was designed to address a particular problem idiosyncratic to
Gamma's position. The company oftenmanaged to convince customer's
front-line employees of the functionality of its offering, only to see a cor-
porate body further up in the customer decision-making hierarchy re-
nege on the emergent agreement because the pricing model was not
acceptable. This often resulted in sales resource misallocation and, po-
tentially, to loss of intellectual property if the technical plans had been
disclosed. MoU 2 attempts to force the customer to escalate the pricing
model, which Gamma expects to be a major stumbling block, to the
customer's board for agreement-in-principle relatively early in the ne-
gotiation process. The sales process only continues with customers
who agree to the pricing model concept and acquire the agreement-
in-principle from their boards.
MoU 3 governs detailed commercial contract negotiations. It is
signed after the customer makes its investment decision and commits
to the pricing model. MoU 3 also contains the ﬁnal delivery scope, the
ﬁnal pricing model, and ﬁnal details for the performance measures.MoU 4, in turn, documents the remaining contractual issues the ﬁrms
agree to before closing the deﬁnitive agreement.
The key feature of the MoUs was that they allow Gamma to pursue
and prosecute changes in their customers. The changes the MoUs
were designed to prompt include the forging of appropriate organiza-
tional interfaces (integration of legal departments, escalation proce-
dures), inﬂuencing value quantiﬁcation tools and processes (i.e.
information exchange schedules) and manipulation of negotiation
ethics (good faith negotiation obligations and prompt termination pro-
visions) and decision-making sequences (escalation procedures). Fur-
ther, Gamma was able to induce changes in customers' behavioral
proclivities by leveraging contractual sanction mechanisms (penalties
for unauthorized use of Gamma designs). In addition, MoU usemay sig-
niﬁcantly alter the negotiation register. Introducing a formal MoU will
likely trigger intervention from customer legal counsel and lend gravi-
tas to the negotiations.
5. Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Theoretical implications
On the theoretical front, the study makes three contributions. First,
we contribute to the scarce literature on the usage of PBC in sales and
marketing (c.f. Datta & Roy, 2011; Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). In par-
ticular, our study provides a more detailed account on how perfor-
mance-based contract design matters. The detailed designs of
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cant success or failure factors in value-based solutions selling than pre-
viously understood. Second, the ﬂipside of the observation is that the
contracts and pricing models will transform into signiﬁcant sales ob-
jects, an issue not identiﬁed in marketing literature. Third, even though
contracts are recognized as useful adaptation and coordination devices
(Schepker et al., 2014), our contention is that contractual techniques
are currently underutilized and likely to constitute effective compo-
nents in precontractual integration models. However, contract utiliza-
tion requires that contracts are enacted and performed in the
functional frame, as devices facilitating coordination and adaptation,
and not only safeguarding.
5.1.1. Contracts as barriers
In a negative sense, contract-related issues may pose signiﬁcant ob-
stacles to successful value-based selling, particularly when sellers at-
tempt to use advanced performance-based contracts to capture a part
of the value their offering creates for the customer.
Gamma's customers were reluctant to adopt value sharing ar-
rangements, as they preferred the traditional cost-plus approaches.
The analysis of customer reactions Gamma's employees reported
during debrieﬁngs suggests that the reason for the resistance is likely
found in the pricingmodel fairness or entrenchment effect identiﬁed
by Töytäri et al. (2015). As most established pricing models build on
ﬁxed price approaches with relatively modest performance-based
compensation features, advanced PBC pricing models are bound
to be non-standard and disruptive of both the established market
role expectations and value allocation patterns. Thus, customers
are likely to resist these changes at least initially, resulting in
signiﬁcant business model inertia that innovator ﬁrms must work
to overcome.
Our study not only corroborates the pricingmodel entrenchment ef-
fect but also provides evidence on an additional source of resistance: the
legal entrenchment effect. The established legal models enjoy a
privileged position. They are perceived as not only fair but also lower
risk than new, untried contract models. We may, at this point in time,
only speculate on the underlying causes of this legal entrenchment ef-
fect. On the one hand, an intuitively appealing explanation suggested
by previous literature (see e.g. Penland, 2006) is that most lawyers are
trained to err on the side of caution and have a professional identity
predicated upon risk identiﬁcation and uncertainty reduction. On the
other hand, as our research suggests, PBC sits awkwardly with the un-
derlying traditional contract law structures, which stress unambiguity,
completeness, and certainty (Macneil, 1978, pp. 862–865). A ﬁxed
price ismuch less problematic than a complicated pricing scheme as ad-
vanced contracts offer genuine legal-technical drafting challenges. The
value drivers are often very complex and difﬁcult to disentangle to
form functional and uncertainty-reducing value measures. Drafting a
contract that satisﬁes the lawyers' yearning for risk reduction and cer-
tainty will be difﬁcult.
5.1.2. Legal sales
The ﬂipside of the importance of contracts as success factors is that,
as a consequence, the contracts should be understood as important sales
objects. The contracts, like value, have to be sold. This aspect is
neglected in the previous marketing literature and, seemingly, by prac-
titioners as well.
Previous research suggests that a key issue in value-based selling is
convincing the customer about the value the seller's offering will create
(Anderson et al., 2008; Terho et al., 2012). Customer conﬁdence is un-
derstood as two-dimensional: the customer must be convinced of the
validity of value measures and conﬁdent that actual additional value
will, in fact, be produced. The capabilities necessary for this aspect of
value-based selling are reasonably well-documented and understood
(e.g. Töytäri & Rajala, 2015).However, our research suggests that a third selling dimension exists
if performance-based contracts are used. Until value-based selling prac-
tices are ﬁrmly entrenched, the sellers will inevitably be seeking to de-
ploy non-standard and market-disruptive pricing models as the pricing
models lack legitimate existing contractual infrastructures. Thus, the
pricing models with their concomitant contract structures will emerge
as signiﬁcant new sales objects. To illustrate, even if the seller had a
highly attractive offering,monetizing the offeringwill be impossible un-
less the seller is able to convince the prospective buyers that the con-
tract structures it proposes are feasible.
These legal sales processes are, however, effectively terra incognita
in both marketing and contract management literature. They will
most likely differ signiﬁcantly from the other sales processes. A key rea-
son for this is that the target audiences are idiosyncratic. The viability
and added value of contract models is primarily evaluated by the
buyers' lawyers. The seller must convince the buyers' lawyers that the
contract model does not impose excessive risks on the buyer and will
function as expected. Access to the lawyers, however, is often controlled
by gatekeepers who have to be ﬁrst convinced that involving the law-
yers is worthwhile. Thus, marketing a contract model will probably be
a two-phase project with two audiences since, ﬁrst, the seller must
pass the gatekeepers to make its case to the second, the lawyers, who
then constitute the ﬁnal sales audience. Each phase requires different
tools. Effective sales materials, arguments, and interfaces are likely to
be different during both phases.
5.1.3. Functional contracting in sales processes
Third, our study underscores the importance, and the simultaneous
neglect, of formal integration and contracting techniques in sales pro-
cesses. We argue that if understood in the functional frame, contractual
techniques may be signiﬁcant value-adding components during sales
phase integration and work to facilitate sellers' attempts to introduce
value-based pricing models.
Our experience with Gamma, along with both empirical and anec-
dotal evidence from other companies, conﬁrms that contract and con-
tractual techniques are not commonly used in typical solution sales
processes, non-disclosure agreements and exclusivity agreements, per-
haps, excluded. In contrast, most sales personnel seem frightened by
contracts and want to avoid involving lawyers like the plague. This en-
tails that sales processes are almost exclusively governed by relational
integrationmechanisms andmethods, based on trust and unarticulated
expectations of civility and appropriate conduct.
Previous studies have conﬁrmed that contracts complement rela-
tional governance mechanisms (see e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002;
Schepker et al., 2014). Our argument is that contracts as formal integra-
tionmechanisms could add important components to sales process gov-
ernance. The reason is simple. Value-based sales processes require the
sellers to carefully coordinate expectations along the value chain, co-
creation of new added value allocation patterns, and appropriate orga-
nizational interfaces, that is, boundary spanning work. For example,
MoU 1 sought to entrench the new sales process within Gamma and af-
fect theway customers' were likely to behave during negotiations. MoU
2 attempted to force a new interface in customers by requiring that the
customer commit to escalating the pricing model to its board for ap-
proval. It is crucial to remember that contracts and contractual tech-
niques are company boundary spanning objects sans rival. Contracting
allows both parties to manipulate each other, affect organizational
structures and interfaces, mindsets, and even ethics, of course in an un-
determined and uncertain fashion. As one senior industry executive
noted when introduced to the functional contracting approach: “You
are trying to manipulate business ethics.”
The use of contracts and contractual techniques during the sales
phase, however, requires some conceptual dexterity. Contrary to classi-
cal contract law's perception (e.g.Macneil, 1978), the contracts and con-
tractual techniques we refer to here are not the deal codiﬁcations that
emerge after successful sales when parties sign the ﬁnal contract.
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jects, point intervention devices deployed to serve particular, limited
functions and address speciﬁc process governance and integrate issues.
Theymight not even live up to the conventional legal standards onwhat
binding contracts are.
The observation that contractual techniques are underutilized may
be extended outside sales processes, to the solution delivery phase.
Davies and Hobday (2005) argue that the solution business requires
sellers to pay attention to organizational boundaries and interoperabil-
ity, as sellers are responsible for ensuring that value is created by the
interlocking and interoperation of processes within two organizations.
Whereas the sales phase functional contracting process allowed
Gamma to affect and sequence the behavior of its customers, the same
approach and tools may be used to facilitate and support the solution
delivery processes. When solutions delivery is a co-creationary process
the success of which requires inputs from both the seller and buyer,
contracts and contracting are a pervasive method for spanning organi-
zational boundaries to implement solution critical management,
resourcing, support, and delivery improvement efforts through the en-
tire life of the product or system in use (Brady, Davies, & Gann, 2005,
p. 364). This insight suggests that the existing literaturemay have failed
to adequately conceptualize and account for the relational integration
aspects of (formal) contractual governance. Consequently, current inte-
gration literature may signiﬁcantly understate the importance and pos-
sibilities of formal but functional contracting and innovative contractual
governance mechanisms in, for example, securing systems integration
in the solution business.
5.2. Managerial implications
This paper is a ground-breaking empirical study of the challenges a
seller encounters while trying to design and introduce tomarket a solu-
tion using advanced performance-based contracts as value capture de-
vices. In addition, the study contains 1) a unique description of how
an advanced performance-based contract can be designed and speci-
ﬁed, and 2) a ﬁrst account of a legal sales process.
We highlight four main learning points that are relevant to man-
agers. First, advanced performance-based contracts are likely to pose
difﬁcult, if not prohibitive, challenges in contract design that correlate
with the complexity of the customers' value functions. Formalizing
and transposing the value functions into functional contractual expres-
sions is difﬁcult and expensive. The costs of designing and operating ad-
vanced performance-based contracts may work to conﬁne the pricing
models to the most proﬁtable business models only and restrict the
time horizon during which the opportunity for introducing them is
open.
Second, our study identiﬁed a serious managerial blind spot, clearly
visible in Gamma, but also probably in existence in other companies.
Companies often view and carry out formal contracting as value adding
only in the context of safeguarding their interests. As a result, contracts
are typically deployed defensively: effective contracting may prevent
proﬁt and value slippage, but is not thought to, in itself, create value.
This mindset may contribute to the management missing new value
creation opportunities and, when canvassing new business opportuni-
ties, to the misallocation of resources to developing business models
with no feasible contractual value capture models.
Third, functional contracting during the sales phase may have great
potential as a management approach.
Example 1: One important objective of MoU 1 was to choreograph
the customer's internal processes. Gamma knew that customer
sales staff would be reluctant to sign the MoU without ﬁrst consult-
ingwith lawyers. Triggering the involvement of customers' legal de-
partments as early as possible was, in fact, Gamma's objective.
Similarly, MoU 2 was, among other things, a litmus test forcustomers' motivations and, consequently, a business intelligence
tool seeking to prevent the misallocation of scarce resources to
hopeless sales cases. Even if the MoU 2 imposes obligations which
are unlikely to be enforced by the courts, the “legal” nature of the
document was likely to repel non-serious and opportunistic buyers.
Example 2: Gamma and Delta, a platform owner, have a fraught re-
lationship as Delta used a platform design which Gamma had
disclosed to it as a tender template during previous, aborted negoti-
ations. How can the trust be restored? Relational integration tools
may fail to achieve what a simple negotiation phase contract could
deliver at a pen stroke. Trust is restored if Gamma and Delta enter
into a contract in which Delta undertakes to not utilize Gamma's de-
signs and pay a penalty should it repeat its previous behavior.
Functional contracting, thus, may open up new avenues andmecha-
nisms to be used to inﬂuence market structures and customers. This
ﬁnding, however, comeswith caveats. Functional contracting is difﬁcult,
requiring deep proactive cross-functional integration of legal, sales and
product development functions and expertise into the seller's business
strategy and sales processes. Raising contracting and legal awareness
among executives and sales staff and careful design of business process-
es which trigger the involvement of legal departments at the right time
is imperative.
Fourth, as Gammamanagers did not identify the need for legal sales
efforts, customers often struggled to make sense of the contracts
Gamma offered. Investing in the design of a legal sales process that
runs parallel to the “traditional” sales process may be a key to success
if andwhen the seller tries to introduce new legal structures to themar-
ket. Managers, however, have to recognize the speciﬁcity of legal sales
processes. The pathways for creating customer conﬁdence in legal mat-
ters are different than for commercial issues. On a practical level, this
entails that the legal sales process must, ﬁrst, target a new set of actors
within customer organizations, namely, the customer's legal depart-
ment, senior executives, and the board, who are the decision-makers
in legal matters. Second, the legal sales process must also engage
these actors in a new kind of co-creation process in which the emphasis
is on legal-technical contract model creation. Third, sellers must also
convince the frontline customer employees of the feasibility of the
contracting model, as access to the decision-makers is restricted and
subject to gatekeepers' approvals. This will probably require signiﬁcant
investments in developing a template for communicating the most cru-
cial aspects of the contracts in a format accessible and understandable to
non-lawyers.5.3. Limitations
The ﬁrst limitation of the study stems from the ongoing nature of
the development process at Gamma. The company has neither been
able to successfully sign deals using the approach, nor has it been
able to entrench the performance-based contracts and the sales pro-
cess externally or internally. Thus, we have no binary (success/fail-
ure) data on, for example, the effects of the functional contracting
process. This threat is mitigated by the fact that the paper is primar-
ily offering an account of the challenges and their likely causes, and
only secondarily tentative conclusions of the effects of the solutions
we propose. Even there, the modality of our conclusions is primarily
conceptual. Second, as the study is an in-depth case study of one case
company, customer and industry, idiosyncrasies may have a
distorting effect on our ﬁndings and conclusions. For example, al-
though our case company struggled, others with stronger offerings
may perform far better in introducing the PBC in value-based solu-
tion selling approaches. The conclusions, thus, may suffer from low
generalizability.
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Our study strongly indicates that further conceptual and empirical
research is necessary. First, further empirical studies should be conduct-
ed to assess the kinds of sales processes that best facilitate the value-
based selling of industrial solutions. These future studies need to gather
data from a wider variety of industries, markets, organizations, and so-
lution offerings.
Second, validating our conclusions on the challenges relating to the
design and marketing of performance-based contracts and the effects
of functional contracting, similarly, requires additional studies. In partic-
ular, functional contracting processes should see more practical testing.
Moreover, due to the intrinsically international nature of current busi-
ness operations, future researchwould beneﬁt from a similar study con-
ducted in a cross-cultural setting unlike our case. Introducing the
approach in, for example, an environment in which contract enforce-
ment is difﬁcult or executives' attitudes and understandings of law
and contracts diverge wildly (e.g. Ruskola, 2002) may disclose yet
more challenges.
Third, as the functional contracting process challenges many con-
ventional sales patterns, mobilizing it in a large sales organization will
likely be problematic. Future research should focus onmapping the spe-
ciﬁc capabilities the approach requires and identifying the strategies
that are effective for entrenching it in sales organizations.Acknowledgements
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